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Remembering Justice in Rwanda:
Locating Gender in the Judicial Construction
of Memory
Matthew J. Burnett1
The struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against
forgetting.
Milan Kundera, The Book of Laughter and Forgetting2
Hated and feared, objects to be despised, yet also of awe, the reified essence
of evil in the very being of their bodies, these figures of the Jew, the black,
the Indian, and woman herself, are clearly objects of cultural construction,
the leaden keel of evil and of mystery stabilizing the ship and course that is
Western history. . . . What sort of understanding—what sort of speech,
writing, and construction of meaning by any mode—can deal with and
subvert that?
Michel Taussig, “Culture of Terror—Space of Death”3

I. THE CHALLENGE OF REMEMBERING JUSTICE IN RWANDA
In January of 2003, approximately 120,000 Rwandans arrested for crimes
arising from the 1994 genocide languished in Rwanda’s eighteen jails.4
They represent a living memorial to the orgy of ethnic violence that left as
many as 800,000 Rwandese Tutsi and sympathetic Hutu dead.5 Over
120,000 bodies imprinted with guilt—in stark contrast, one imagines, to the
post-genocidal landscape littered with hundreds of thousands of bodies. It
is within these prisons that memory is confined, or else suffocated,6 so that
it can be officially translated by an increasingly complex system of courts in
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order to produce, challenge, and legitimize accounts of a genocide that
scarred both a nation and the international order.
Given the horrifically totalizing effect of the genocide, Leave None to
Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, the title of Alison Des Forges’s
impressive account, seems particularly apt.7 Within the one hundred days
following the downing of President Habyarimana’s plane on April 6, 1994,8
approximately three-quarters of the Tutsi population was exterminated.9
Accounts of the resulting genocide are both complicated and contested,
citing causes ranging from ancient ethnic hostility to Western colonialism
and present-day geopolitics. Regardless of the genocide’s root causes,
however, one fact remains:
[T]he killers who executed the genocide were not demons nor
automatons responding to ineluctable forces. They were people
who chose to do evil. Tens of thousands, swayed by fear, hatred,
or hope of profit, made the choice quickly and easily. They were
the first to kill, rape, rob and destroy.10
The perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide were human, as were their
victims. They are, with the rest of us, bound by a common humanity.
Memory and history, whether harmonious or hostile, are the human record
of this bond. The story of the Rwandan genocide must be both told and
remembered, and the way in which it is told and remembered must also be
considered part of this story.
The following article considers what it means to remember mass atrocity
by investigating both the character and normative force of the judicial
responses to it. Specifically, I wish to develop an account of courts as
technologies of memory—official institutions that produce, challenge, and
legitimize memory—within the context of a specific human atrocity. I will
concentrate my analysis on investigating how judicial responses to the
Rwandan genocide have constructed the stories of women, the women’s
role in the process, and the acts of rape and sexual violence perpetrated
against them. This is, of course, only one of the many lenses that can be
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used to understand this process, but it is one that resonates throughout both
the genocide and the judicial responses to it.
Before going into detail about the system of courts having jurisdiction
over crimes committed during the genocide, which is developed in Parts II,
III, and IV, I will address three background concepts that I believe are
crucial to this analysis. First, I will briefly consider the operation of
memory in response to mass atrocity. Second, I will consider how courts,
as technologies of memory, act as institutions that produce, challenge, and
legitimize memory. Finally, I will attempt to set the stage for the
subsequent analysis of the role of memory in the judicial responses to the
Rwandan genocide by narrowing the analysis to gender, rape, and sexual
violence.
A. Collective Memory and Mass Atrocity
Forgetting extermination is part of extermination, because it is also
the extermination of memory, of history, of the social, etc. This
forgetting is as essential as the event, in any case unlocatable by
us, inaccessible to us in its truth. This forgetting is still too
dangerous, it must be effaced by an artificial memory (today,
everywhere, it is artificial memories that efface the memory of
man, that efface man in his own memory).
Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation11
Unlike the system of amnesty for truth pursued in South Africa, for
example, each judicial response to the Rwandan genocide appears to be
founded on an ethic of retribution.12 Interestingly, the etymological root of
amnesty, from the Latin amnēstia and the Greek amnēstiā, is “amnesia” or
“to forget.”13 This is precisely the challenge that Jean Baudrillard
anticipates when he argues that forgetting extermination is part of
extermination, because it also entails the extermination of memory, history,
and the social.
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Contemporary investigations into the role of memory in societies can be
traced to the work of Maurice Halbwachs, a student of Durkheim,14 who
carefully distinguishes between history and collective memory. Halbwachs
argues that history relates to the documentation of change or the
manufacture of a historical record, whereas collective memory is concerned
with the active repetition or reenactment of the past.15 More recently, Paul
Connerton has distinguished “social memory from a more specific practice
that is best termed the activity of historical reconstruction.”16 According to
Connerton, historical reconstruction is the practice of organizing knowledge
of human activities through human “traces”; the assemblage of these traces
is the inferential task of the historian.17 For Connerton, this practice can
and does shape collective memory, for example, “when a state apparatus is
used in a systematic way to deprive its citizens of their memory.”18
The work of both Halbwachs and Connerton provide special insight into
the present investigation. On Halbwachs’s account, collective memory is
concerned with the active repetition or reenactment of the past. Courts
provide a useful setting for the reenactment of the past because they afford
both a public forum and procedural safeguards that offer both sides to a
dispute the opportunity to present their version of the facts. Connerton
further argues that collective memory can be reshaped by historical
reconstruction, or what might be referred to as the manufacture of “official
history,” for example, when a state apparatus such as a court or tribunal is
used in a systematic way to deprive its citizens of their memory. Courts, as
critical apparatus of the state, are not immune from the reshaping (and
indeed deprivation) of memory, especially given the fact that they must
settle on one version of the facts in order to formulate an opinion. That is, a
court’s judgment necessarily endorses or legitimizes a particular version of
the facts, which can thereby affect the way in which these facts are
collectively remembered.
In the wake of mass atrocity, fears of procedural corruption and factual
distortion are necessarily amplified. As such, judicial responses to mass

GENDER AND JUSTICE IN AFRICA

Remembering Justice in Rwanda

atrocity deserve greater scrutiny, particularly with respect to how the
judicial process shapes the way in which an atrocity is remembered. It is
this set of concerns that gives rise to the characterization of judicial
responses to mass atrocity as technologies of memory, where what must be
examined is how a specific social institution, such as a court or other
judicial response to mass atrocity, generates and embodies memory in the
context of a specific social framework (i.e., a local community, a state, or
even the wider international community).
B. Courts as Technologies of Memory
In a lecture entitled “Technologies of the Self,” Michel Foucault
developed a system of organizing different “technologies” operating in
society; they include technologies of production, technologies of sign
systems, technologies of power, and technologies of the self.19 Building on
this framework, Marita Sturken refers to the media as a “technology of
memory” because it both embodies and generates cultural memory.20 For
the purposes of this analysis, I wish to consider the various courts
responding to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda in a similar fashion. That is, to
approach courts as technologies that not only embody and generate cultural
memory but that also have the power to challenge or legitimize it. It is
problematic to assume that there is any hard and fast distinction between
history and collective memory because there is always a range of individual
and collective memories that act to challenge official history.
It is this tension that the courts adjudicating crimes arising out of the
Rwandan genocide face. For example, one of the important sociojuridical
techniques of courts is their role as pedagogical instruments.21 In
postgenocide Rwanda, the adjudication of crimes is a potential means by
which to inform local, national, and international discourses about mass
atrocity and its devastating effects, as well as change the way in which the
genocide is remembered. In order to efface forgetting, it is crucial that
memory be effected. In some instances this may legitimize individual or
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collective memory, and in other instances it may challenge it. Regardless, it
is important to understand that the outcome is powerfully dependant on the
way in which courts consciously or unconsciously adjudicate memory.
C. Gendered Memory: The Adjudication of Rape and Sexual Violence
I have chosen the adjudication of charges of rape and sexual violence as
the basis for this investigation for two reasons. First, the use of rape and
sexual violence in ethnic conflict has recently become a matter of serious
concern for international human rights, criminal, and humanitarian law. A
meaningful basis for addressing gender-based crimes must be integrated
into this overlapping and often confused discourse. Catharine MacKinnon
specifically addresses this concern when she asks, in her 1993 Oxford
Amnesty lecture, whether the “word ‘woman,’ like the word ‘Jew,’ will
finally come to stand, among its meanings, for a reality of abuse that cannot
be forgotten, a triumph of survival against all that wanted you dead, a
principle of what cannot be done to a human being.”22 In the alternative,
Richard Rorty asks whether being nonmale is in fact a way of being
nonhuman.23 In order to understand how to prevent violence against
women, we must concern ourselves with how this reality of abuse figures
into both the adjudication of rape and sexual violence and the way in which
we collectively address and remember this reality.
My second concern is that Rwanda’s genocide has been both consciously
and unconsciously constructed as a “gendercide.” On this view, it was
primarily Tutsi men who were the target of killings throughout the
genocide.24 For example, one commentator recounts that early in the
genocide “killers in Gikongoro told a woman that she was safe because ‘sex
has no ethnic group.’”25 From mid-May onward, however, there were
indications that the resolution to kill women was made at the national level
and began to be increasingly realized locally.26 The rationale for this choice
may be linked to the reproductive threat posed by Tutsi women, who were
believed to ostensibly produce Tutsi children, regardless of the ethnic

GENDER AND JUSTICE IN AFRICA

Remembering Justice in Rwanda

identity of their partner. In Rwanda, as in all societies, sex and ethnicity are
interconnected. Thus, to characterize gendered accounts of genocide
merely in terms of the number of men or women killed, at the expense of a
thorough account of the acts of rape and sexual violence perpetrated, seems
to confirm MacKinnon’s suspicion that the word “woman” may well stand
for a reality of abuse that has been forgotten. This reality becomes
increasingly bleak when considered against the thousands of Rwandan
women who continue to die slowly from HIV/AIDS, infected as a result of
rape during the genocide.27 Understanding the ways in which courts
adjudicate rape and sexual violence, as well as its effect on how these
abuses are remembered, may well provide insight into how judicial
responses to mass atrocity can either make or unmake the word “woman”
stand for a way of being that is worth remembering.

II. THE ICTR AND AKAYESU: RAPE AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The safety of the People, requireth further, from him, or them that
have the Soveraign Power, that Justice be equally administered to
all degrees of People; that is, that as well the rich, and mighty, as
poor and obscure persons, may be righted of the injuries done
them; so as the great, may have no greater hope of impunity, when
they doe violence, dishonour, or any Injury to the meaner sort, than
when one of these, does the like to one of them: For in this
consisteth Equity; to which, as being a Precept of the Law of
Nature, a Soveraign is as much subject, as any of the meanest of
his People.
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan28
In 1994, the United Nations (UN) Security Council, acting on its powers
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, established the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to prosecute “persons responsible for genocide
and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in
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the territory of Rwanda, and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and
other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States,
between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.”29 Located in Arusha,
Tanzania, the Tribunal’s jurisdiction covers both genocide and crimes
against humanity, as well as violations of Common Article 3 and Additional
Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions.30
A. The Akayesu Case
Among the individuals convicted by the ICTR is Jean-Paul Akayesu, a
former mayor of Taba commune. In the Akayesu opinion, the ICTR held
for the first time that sexual violence and rape are crimes against humanity
and instruments of genocide.31 Interestingly, the original indictment against
Akayesu contained no charges of rape or sexual violence.32 It was only
during testimony that “allegations of sexual violence first came to the
attention of the ICTR Chamber through the testimony of Witness J, a Tutsi
woman, who stated that her six-year-old daughter had been raped by three
Interahamwe when they came to kill her father.”33 Further investigation
into sexual violence perpetrated in Taba produced overwhelming testimony,
including accounts of gang rape, sexual slavery, penetration by foreign
objects, and public humiliation.34 Some of the women testifying lost count
of the number of times they were raped, others contemplated death as a
more humane alternative.35 The amended indictment, which included the
charges of rape and sexual violence, was largely motivated by Judge Pillay,
a South African woman and former president of the ICTR, who stated that
[w]e have to try a case before us where this person [Akayesu] has
not been specifically charged with rape. . . . We’re hearing the
evidence, but the defense counsel has not cross-examined the
witnesses who gave testimony of sexual violence, because it is not
in the indictment. I’m extremely dismayed that we’re hearing
evidence of rape and sexual violence against women and children,
yet it is not in the indictments because the witnesses were never
asked about it.36
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Taken together, the harrowing accounts of rape and sexual violence
perpetrated in Taba commune provided the ICTR, as an internationally
sanctioned judicial body, the opportunity to develop a normative
jurisprudential framework for treating rape and sexual violence as crimes
against humanity and instruments of genocide.
Indeed, the Akayesu case has been called “the most important decision
rendered thus far in the history of women’s jurisprudence.”37 As crimes
against humanity, the court distinguished between acts of rape and acts of
sexual violence. Rape was held to be “a physical invasion of a sexual
nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive,”
and sexual violence was held to be “any act of a sexual nature which is
committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive.”38 The
court also expressly included “threats, intimidation, extortion and other
forms of duress which prey on fear or desperation” as constituting rape or
sexual violence.39 The court then identified a range of possible forms of
coercion, from the presence of military officers to the giving of direct
orders.40 Finally, the court held that in order to qualify as a crime against
humanity both rape and sexual violence must be committed widely or
systematically against a civilian population, based on the grounds of
nationality, ethnicity, political belief, race, or religion.41
There are a number of observations about this framework worth noting.
First, the court makes clear efforts to distinguish between rape and sexual
violence, even though the first is seemingly wholly contained within the
latter. One important reason for this distinction may be that by making it,
the court pushes the normative jurisprudential framework to consider acts
that may not be rape, but that are inhumane nonetheless. This is the case
even where the court’s discussion is limited to rape, of which it says “there
is no commonly accepted definition . . . in international law.”42 From this
observation, the court concedes that “rape has been defined in certain
national jurisdictions as non-consensual intercourse,” but adds that the
definition may also include the insertion of non-sexual objects into a
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victim”43 (the example given is a witness’s account of a dying woman being
penetrated by a piece of wood).44 Here the court responded to the actual
acts perpetrated in Taba and then constructed a jurisprudential narrative that
was capable of encompassing them. Indeed, the court even acknowledged
that it was developing a broad conceptual framework, rather than attempting
to reduce these acts to “a mechanical description of objects and body
parts.”45
Second, the court’s broad conception of sexual violence includes acts that
do not involve physical contact. For example, a number of witnesses
testified to being forced to undress publicly,46 and one woman testified that
Akayesu ordered that she be undressed and forced to do gymnastics in a
courtyard.47 Thus, acts of sexual humiliation, even without physical
contact, count as sexual violence.
In this sense, the Akayesu opinion is a good illustration of how principles
of international human rights, criminal, and humanitarian law are developed
in the context of a specific reality, even if they are applicable universally.
Akayesu is also a good example of the creation of an expanded
jurisprudential narrative that specifically addresses the confluence of ethnic
and sexual violence. What begins as a specific account of brutal criminal
behavior becomes a story about how rape and sexual violence are
instrumentally relevant to the judicial construction of universal norms—
here, the customary international law norms of genocide and crimes against
humanity. This narrative clearly serves future victims of genocidal rape and
sexual violence. But who exactly benefits from the narrative is not the most
important focus. From the perspective of deterrence, the message must be
that rape and sexual violence count as crimes against humanity and as
instruments of genocide, regardless of any specific cultural or political
context.
However, in analyzing the ICTR as a technology of memory, we must
also press the hard questions in an attempt to make sense, if possible, of the
broader narrative that it elicits. One problem, for example, is that in its

GENDER AND JUSTICE IN AFRICA

Remembering Justice in Rwanda

capacity as a technology of memory, the ICTR can only offer an account of
the thinnest principles of justice and therefore may be incapable of
providing thick narrative descriptions of the genocide. 48 Acting on its UN
mandate, the best that the restricted Tribunal may be able to offer is an
instrumental account of how, in this particular case, sexual and ethnic
violence are intimately interconnected and, as such, how rape and sexual
violence ought to be viewed as crimes against humanity and instruments of
genocide. This approach does little, however, to reconcile the cultural
attitudes about women in Rwanda that helped to legitimize the acts of rape
and sexual violence perpetrated against them.
Another example of a problem raised in this context is whether there is,
or should be, any meaningful distinction between sexual torture and sexual
violence, or better, whether the normative juridical narrative produced by
the ICTR allows for such a distinction. A worthwhile case to investigate on
this point is Prosecutor v. Kambanda, which considers the guilty plea of
Jean Kambanda, former prime minister of the Interim Government of
Rwanda.49
In Kambanda, the ICTR asserted that “Category One
perpetrators include those who, ‘committed acts of sexual violence.’”50 As
it turns out, this is not true of the Rwandan Organic Law. Instead, Rwandan
law distinguishes between sexual torture and sexual violence. When torture
is committed in the course of another crime, it is punishable by death;
however, when sexual violence is committed in the course of another crime,
it is not. Thus, “[s]ince Category One defendants are subject to the death
penalty, the Organic Law would enact a retroactive increase in penalties if it
read ‘sexual violence’ rather than ‘sexual torture.’”51
The point here is to highlight a problem that arises out of the ICTR’s
totalizing narrative that could, as demonstrated in the example above, mean
the difference between life and death. As long as the thinnest principles of
justice are applied, there is an inevitable problem of translating these
normative principles within specific cases. Although the ICTR cannot
sentence an indiviudal to death, the question is still whether we choose to
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sacrifice the normative jurisprudence, or to sacrifice justice to the individual
(by interpreting the law in such a way that an individual is subject to a
retroactive increase in penalty). To be effective, the ICTR must provide
some guidelines and definitions in order to adjudicate sexual violence
against women. But in doing so, the ICTR necessarily limits and
legitimizes a framework that translates particular crimes into a normative
expression of international law.
B. The Laughing Judges
The preceding cases from the ICTR included, and indeed hinged upon,
victims sharing intensely personal testimony. In this context, concerns about
victim support are necessarily amplified, and as a result, courtroom conduct
has come under increased scrutiny. Perhaps the most widely reported
example of this problem is the case of the “laughing judges,” which
involves an incident where, during witness testimony about her rape by one
of the accused, the judges suddenly began laughing.52 Although witnesses
indicate that the judges were not laughing at the victim, or even about her
testimony, concerns were raised as to whether victims would be
discouraged from testifying because of the incident.53
The case of the laughing judges challenges the universal character of the
ICTR’s judgments because it highlights the fact that such judgments are
made by adjudicators who carry their own cultural baggage and who must
necessarily adjudicate from a specific context. This is part and parcel of
their decisions and impacts the way in which courts produce, challenge, and
legitimize how these crimes are remembered. However, this
characterization should not be perceived as constructing an evaluative
framework by which we can endorse or condemn the ICTR judges
involved. Instead, the case of the laughing judges provides a litmus test for
the limits of normative jurisprudence.
A consequence for the characterization of the ICTR as a technology of
memory is how this incident and others similar to it affect the way in which
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the adjudication of rape and sexual violence perpetrated during the
Rwandan genocide is remembered. For example, the victim testifying in
this instance was presumably traumatized by such an outbreak, regardless of
the reasons behind the judges’ laughter. Further, some have argued that
victims who had heard about the laughing judges were dissuaded from
testifying.54 The Rwandan government has also used this incident as a basis
for criticizing the effectiveness of the ICTR. The case of the laughing
judges thus challenges the normative force of the ICTR’s treatment of rape
and sexual violence, and as such necessarily challenges the way in which
these crimes are remembered.

III. RWANDA’S NATIONAL COURTS: MEMORY AT THE
INTERSECTION OF COLONIALISM, GENDER, AND JUSTICE
In discussing Rwanda’s national courts as technologies of memory, it is
important to consider that Rwanda’s Organic Law, like any domestic law,
must function within the context of Rwandan culture. Thus, the narrative
produced with respect to gender-based crimes is contextualized by the role
of women in Rwandan culture, and any discussion of Rwandan culture must
also address the legacy of colonialism. I will begin with an analysis of the
colonial legacy of Rwanda, then discuss gender roles in Rwanda both
before and during the genocide, and finally I will briefly describe the
structure of the national genocide courts, as well as the tensions implicit in
these interrelationships.
A. The Colonial Legacy of Rwanda
The first colonial power to assume control in Rwanda was Germany,
which controlled the country from 1894 and 1916.55 During World War I,
the Belgians took control of Rwanda until its independence in 1962.56 The
Belgian colonial rulers, like so many other colonial powers, implemented a
strategy that purposefully exacerbated ethnic division in order to
manufacture a ruling class that could be more easily controlled by the
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colonial power. Prior to colonial rule, the Tutsi minority controlled the
Rwandan aristocracy; however, there is seemingly little evidence of ethnic
hostility. In order to pursue an efficient means of control, and consistent
with emerging theories in the biology of race of that time, the Belgians used
the Tutsi’s more “European” physical characteristics as the basis for
maintaining their racial, and thus moral and intellectual, superiority.57 This
division was further exacerbated by a system of identity cards, similar to the
pass system used during apartheid in South Africa, which designated all
Rwandan citizens as Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa (a small ethnic minority in
Rwanda, comprising only 1 to 2 percent of the population).58 This identity
card system continued until the 1994 genocide, when it was often exploited
by Hutus to determine the ethnicity of Tutsi attempting to flee the country.
After World War II, however, it was the Tutsi aristocracy that led the
way to independence. The Tutsi leadership caused the Belgians to shift their
colonial policy and embrace Hutus,59 which resulted in the killing of
thousands of Tutsi and a mass exodus of Tutsi into neighboring states.
Under President Habyarimana, who took power in 1973,60 many Tutsi who
remained in Rwanda lost their wealth and power. Exiled Tutsi, primarily in
Uganda, formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in order to overthrow
the Hutu-controlled government in Rwanda.61 The RPF occupied the
northeast of Rwanda in 1990 and continued attacks until 1993, when
Habyarimana agreed to a power-sharing arrangement.62 This agreement
also established a UN peacekeeping force (UNAMIR) in the Rwandan
capital of Kigali.63 Tensions around this power-sharing agreement appear
to have paved the way to the beginnings of a plan in 1992 for a solution to
the so-called “Tutsi problem,” the April 6th downing of Habyarimana’s
plane, and the resulting genocide.
B. Colonialism and the Construction of Gender in Rwanda
The colonial influence in Rwanda is far more complex than can be
adequately discussed here, and indeed no account of the colonial legacy of
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Rwanda goes so far as to wholly explain the genocide.64 Instead, the focus
here is the intersection of gender and colonialism in Rwanda as a basis for
understanding how gender is constructed by the Rwandan national genocide
courts. In “Body Politics and the Rwandan Crisis,” Erin Baines takes up
this issue as she explores the impact of colonialism and the construction of
gender in Rwanda.
Baines argues that “the colonial period inscribed the body as a site of
political identity and belonging to historical nations.”65 Specifically, Baines
explores how the myth of the “Hutu nation,” an ideology developed during
the struggle for independence from Belgium, was instrumental in
constructing gender roles within the context of nationhood. Women’s
bodies, she argues, are realized and organized in terms of reproductive
capacity and identification with motherhood. A “woman’s fertility in
Rwanda is culturally intertwined with her bodily fluids—her ability to bleed
(menstruation), to secrete vaginal fluid, and to produce milk.”66 Employing
the work of C. Taylor, a medical anthropologist who argues that Rwandan
women often draw analogies between bodily illness, such as the inability to
lactate, to other social domains such as their husbands and in-laws,67 Baines
highlights the narrative linkages from body, to household, to community,
and finally to nation. These linkages provide a coherent narrative that
identifies the role of women as not only biological reproducers but as
reproducers of the Rwandan nation, and specifically the Hutu nation. It is
this latter construction of Hutu nationalism, a product of colonialism, that
presents a challenge to radical Hutu elements within Rwandan society. At
the same time, the cultural associations between Hutu and Tutsi have never
been so isolated. Hutu and Tutsi were friends, lovers, and spouses, and both
are burdened by the devastating economic and ecological conditions
affecting Rwanda.
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C. Rwanda’s National Genocide Courts
It is within this context that the colonial legacy of Rwanda and the
construction of gender intersect with the jurisdiction of the Rwandan
national courts. In mid-July of 1994, the new Rwandan government stated
its intention to prosecute crimes perpetrated during the genocide. However,
it did not have either the civil capacity (judges, lawyers, investigators, etc.)
or the legislation to properly handle crimes against humanity or genocide.68
This latter constraint was resolved when, in 1996, the government adopted
the Organic Law on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offences
Constituting the Crimes of Genocide or Crimes against Humanity
Committed since October 1990 (hereinafter Organic Law).69 The Organic
Law created a special chamber for trying cases of genocide and organized
four “categories” of offenses: Category One, leaders and planners of
genocide and notorious murderers using excessive malice; Category Two,
perpetrators or accomplices in homicide; Category Three, accomplices in
crimes without intent to kill; and Category Four, offenses against property.
Even so, the administration of the Organic Law remained problematic. For
example, one commentator argued that
[t]he lack of defense counsel, well trained judges, and other
protections has lead to violations of international standards of due
process and Rwandan law during the trials. . . . Some of the first
trials involving multiple defendants, were openly biased against
the defendants, and lasted only a few hours.70
A case in point is the public execution of twenty-two individuals convicted
of crimes of genocide in April of 1998, many of whom had not received a
fair trial.71 More recent reports, however, “indicate that the conduct of trials
has improved and that the trials now meet international standards.”72
Currently, the primary concern is the many individuals imprisoned in
squalid conditions while awaiting trial, some of whom are women.73
Although prosecutors prepared thousands of cases for trial by 1996, few
included charges of rape and sexual violence against women.74 Moreover,
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those women who attempted to file claims faced a range of barriers,
including a lack of systematic investigations into rape and a lack of
knowledge that rape and sexual violence were prosecutable crimes.75
Adding to this problem was the lack of female judicial investigators and
judges, as well as the fact that many Rwandan women did not report rape
because they thought it was immaterial, had little faith in the justice system,
and/or feared retaliation.76
While the genocide legislation enacted in 1996 does include “acts of
sexual torture” as a Category One crime,77 rape was not included as a
Category One crime until the passing of the Organic Law of January 26,
2001.78 From 1997 to June 2002, the courts tried 7,211 individuals for
genocide, with 1,386 acquittals and 689 sentenced to death (the last
execution occurred in 1998).79 It is not clear how many of these cases
involved charges of sexual torture, but given the inadequate attention paid
to reports of rape and sexual violence during the initial investigations, it is
likely to be few.
Thus, one lesson to learn from the inadequate processing of gender-based
crimes by the Rwandan national courts is that the social, historical, and
political context in which the Rwandan judiciary works may produce,
challenge, and legitimize the way in which Rwandans remember these
crimes, even in the absence of effective justice. That is, the effect of doing
little or nothing at all tells a story in itself and powerfully challenges
Rwandans’ memory of the events. Such treatment points to a hierarchy of
values imbedded in Rwandan society, and this hierarchy may see the
prosecution of rape and sexual violence as a lesser concern than the goal of
constructing and deploying a postgenocidal sense of nationalism and
nationhood. There is little doubt, for example, that the mass public
execution of twenty-two Hutus was intended to demonstrate to Rwandan
citizens that justice was being done, even if the evidence suggests that the
exectution itself was unjust.
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The range of jurisprudential narratives available to the nation seems to
shift depending on which orientation the government chooses to promote as
the basis for nationbuilding. This process reflects the specific social,
historical, and political realities that are produced, challenged, and
legitimized by both internal and external actors. For example, concerns
about effective defense counsel and the death penalty may elicit a national
narrative that is believed to trump individual rights. However, to conclude
that the ineffective prosecution of rape and sexual violence is merely a
result of a conscious political motive misses the mark entirely. Rather, it is
the confluence of history, collective memory (both ethnic and national), and
political will that challenges the Rwandan judiciary to either act or fail to
act. Based on the colonial legacy of Rwanda, the parallel construction of
gender and nationhood, and a history of ethnic tensions, the choice was not
to aggressively prosecute these crimes. However, this reality may shift as
gacaca courts, discussed in the next section, and are more extensively relied
upon to address these crimes.

IV. GACACA COURTS: THE POTENTIAL FOR GENDERED JUSTICE?
I don’t think that it will achieve much of anything. I think of my
family, which was large, with many children. . . . Everyone was
killed. Try to understand, there are only three children and my
mother who remain alive. Do you think that we will have the
strength to come forward in gacaca?
Rape Survivor B.R., “Struggling to Survive: Barriers to Justice for Rape
Victims in Rwanda,” Human Rights Watch 80
In Kinyarwandan, the most widely spoken language in Rwanda, gacaca
means “grass” or “lawn.”81 Gacaca is a traditional system of justice deeply
rooted in Rwandan culture, whereby elders gather together to resolve
community conflicts. More recently, a modified version of gacaca has been
established to adjudicate crimes arising out of the 1994 Rwandan genocide.
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The current incarnation was initially established by the Organic Law of
January 26, 2001, Setting Up “Gacaca Jurisdictions” and Organizing
Prosecutions for Offences Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes
Against Humanity Committed between October 1, 1990, and December 31,
1994, as an innovative approach to deal with a backlog in the courts and the
enormous number of individuals detained on allegations of committing
crimes during the genocide.82 Specifically, the law expanded Category One
crimes (as defined in the 1996 Genocide Law) to include the crime of rape;
established 11,000 gacaca courts at different administrative levels in
Rwanda; and required that Category One crimes (including rape and sexual
torture) be transferred to Rwanda’s national courts for adjudication.83 A
new law,84 adopted in June of 2004, significantly modified the gacaca
system. It eliminated gacaca courts at the district and provincial
administrative levels, reduced the number of judges from nineteen to nine at
each court, narrowed Category Four crimes, expanded Category One, Two,
and Three crimes, and established further safeguards for victims of rape.85
The following section reflects upon two aspects of gacaca. First, I will
consider whether gacaca has the potential to contribute more fully to the
process of remembering justice in Rwanda. Second, I will address the
challenges presented by gacaca for remembering justice through the
adjudication of gender-based crimes.
A. Remembering Justice Through Gacaca
In June of 2002, pilot gacaca proceedings began in eighty cell-level
courts over twelve sectors, one in each of the twelve established pilot
districts.86 Gacaca was expanded to 118 sectors in 106 districts in
November of 2002, and in June 2004 pretrial proceedings were set to begin
in all 9,201 courts at the cell level.87 However, as of September 2004, no
new trials had begun.88 Given the sheer number of courts, and the fact that
they parallel the governmental administrative structure in Rwanda, there is
good reason to believe that more Rwandans than ever will be exposed to the
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adjudication of crimes arising from the 1994 genocide. Unlike the ICTR
and Rwanda’s national courts, which afford only limited exposure to the
adjudication of these crimes, gacaca allows Rwandans the opportunity to
actively take part in the administration of justice. Moreover, because
gacaca courts will hear all cases that where not passed to the national courts
by March 15, 2001, they will adjudicate a large number of cases and serve
as a prehearing chamber for Category One crimes.89 As such, gacaca has the
potential to fundamentally impact the way in which the adjudication of
crimes arising from the 1994 genocide is remembered.
While the basis for establishing the modern-day gacaca is tied to the need
to efficiently process the over 100,000 individuals charged with crimes
committed during the genocide, its potential therapeutic affect cannot be
ignored. The ICTR, located outside of Rwanda, and Rwanda’s national
courts, which have been plagued with problems ranging from insufficient
staffing to the inconsistent application of Rwandan Law, cannot likewise
claim success in helping Rwandans feel that justice has been done. By
placing the adjudicative mechanism within the communities most affected
by the devastating effects of the genocide and making the proceedings
public, it is probable that a greater level of legitimacy will be achieved.
However, within the context of gender-based crimes, the result is likely to
be different. As will be address in the following section, both social and
legal limitations exist for the adjudication of the crimes of rape and sexual
violence through gacaca.
B. The Limits of Gacaca for Remembering Gender-Based Crimes
As stated above, all Category One crimes (including rape and sexual
violence) must be transferred from the gacaca jurisdiction to Rwanda’s
national courts. However, gacaca will still process the initial proceedings
for all Category One crimes that were not transferred to Rwanda’s national
courts before March 15, 2001.90 Further, victims will have to renew their
claims in gacaca courts—a difficult proposition for victims of rape and
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sexual violence.91 Indeed, because of the risk of humiliation, alienation,
ridicule, and even revenge that is inherent in the reporting of gender-based
crimes, the June 2004 Gacaca Law established a number of safeguards to
protect victims of rape and sexual violence that did not previously exist.
Under the 2001 law, victims of rape and sexual violence were required to
testify orally or in writing before the one hundred-member (or more)
general assembly; in the case of written testimony, the law required the
chief judge to read it aloud to the general assembly.92 The only other option
for victims of rape and sexual violence under the 2001 law was to testify in
camera before both the accused and a panel of nineteen judges.93 Under the
2004 Gacaca Law, this process has been modified to allow in camera
testimony privately before one judge.94
Because victims of rape and sexual violence face a clear risk of social
stigma by reporting and providing testimony in the context of gender-based
crimes, the protections afforded by both the 2001 and 2004 laws are
necessary. However, the very public nature of gacaca, which contributes
more fully to remembering justice in Rwanda, is compromised. While
protecting the privacy and dignity of victims of rape and sexual violence
likely trump concerns about how these crimes will be remembered, this
result is unfortunate. Even if it is the case that Rwandans accept that
gender-based crimes were committed widely and systematically during the
genocide and are able to openly discuss the tragic effects of these crimes on
Rwandan society, the fact that they are likely to be adjudicated privately
will not contribute as fully to the way in which the judicial treatment of
gender-based crimes is remembered. This is a result that we must except as
a matter of decency to the victims, but it does not mean that steps cannot be
taken to record these crimes. At minimum, didacted reports and testimony
could be collected so that these accounts are not lost to the very procedures
implemented to protect victims of rape and sexual violence. It may be that
they can then be translated into a more public medium (e.g., a memorial) in
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order to contribute more fully to the way in which these crimes are
collectively remembered.

V. CONCLUSION: WHY REMEMBER?
Permutations between thresholds of horror and thresholds of the
socially acceptable are: imaginable but impossible; unimaginable
but possible; imaginable and possible; unimaginable and
impossible. When all four are in operation, it is the thresholds
themselves that require revision not because they have gone
beyond their own conceivable limits, but because the limits have
been introjected into the system’s core. In the case of violence and
horror, it is clear that a revision of their “exterior nature” to the
boundaries of society is in order for their “unimaginable
possibility” is nothing but the masking of the quiet routine of the
system.
André Lepecki, “Stress,” in Remembering the Body95
This article began by exploring the role of memory in societies after mass
atrocity, and how judicial responses to mass atrocity inform the way we
remember human violence. It then explored the adjudication of rape and
sexual violence committed during the Rwandan genocide, with emphasis on
the three courts that have jurisdiction over crimes arising from the Rwandan
genocide: the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Rwandan
national courts, and the local gacaca courts. Throughout, I have attempted
to explain, explore, and challenge the adjudication memory in the context of
gender-based crimes in the context the 1994 Rwandan genocide. As with
most investigations, more questions have been raised than answers
provided. But it is often the case that questions motivate reflection,
whereas answers may retard it. We must understand the questions,
including the hard ones, in order to make sense of the range of possible
answers. For example, how should the international community respond to
violence on a scale of 800,000 deaths in approximately 100 days? What
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does justice demand? Does it not demand that we acknowledge the massive
rape and sexual violence perpetrated against women? Does it demand more
death? Does it require the truth? Must this truth be officially legitimized?
Does it demand that we remember? Or does justice relieve us of this
obligation?
Lepecki argues that the very unimaginable possibility of violence has the
potential to simply mask the quiet routine of the system.96 A system in
which the word “woman,” to borrow from MacKinnon, stands for a reality
of abuse that is often forgotten. But this forgetting, as Baudrillard argues, is
still too dangerous, and it must be effaced by an artificial memory. We may
take issue with the idea of effacing forgetting with artificial memory, but it
seems as though this is the very challenge that we are faced with. Do we let
memories of human violence and mass atrocity fade into the archives of
history, unchallenged, or do we actively engage memory, and count the
judicial responses to mass violence and mass atrocity as part of this
process? It is important to note that artificial memory in this context does
not necessarily mean false memory, but rather memory which is freed up in
such a way that it does not merely mask the quiet routine of the system, of
progress, and of yet another “never again.” That is, to remember violence
and mass atrocity so that it can be recognized as something distinct, as well
as something that has the potential to efface forgetting. The role of courts
in this process is crucial because they can powerfully influence the way in
which we remember mass atrocity. Although justice must be done, we must
not forget that the way in which courts produce, challenge, and legitimize
memory is part of justice, and as such we must pay more careful attention to
the ways in which judicial responses to mass atrocity influence how, what,
and why we remember.
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